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In this imaginary dialogue between the economist and the 
lawyer, both attempt to analyze the recent decisions of the 
U.S. Supreme Court, applying the norms of their respective 
disciplines, and seek to derive a principle that would assist in 
formulating a course of action for the future. To those brought 
up in the classic tradition of Anglo-American law, the para-
meters employed to reach a decision in these cases may not 
be entirely intelligible. However, the determination of the 
applicable principle in the milieu of the current shift of the 
frontiers of law needs not only a new perspective, but a judicial 
calculus of new and complex variables involving critical in-
finitesimals, and one can discern both in the majority opinion 
and the dissent a groping for the essentials of the many ele-
ments that would count in yielding a just resolution. In the 
evaluation of such a resolution, the considerations that emerge 
from the dialogue should be of substantial help both to the 
judge and the practitioner. 
The Bangor Punta Opinion: An 
Interdisciplinary Conversation 
Q : Now that the U.S. Supreme Court has decided Bangor Punta,1 
I trust you legal academjcs will pay more attention to econo-
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School. 
1 Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926 ( 1977). 
99 
.YALE LAW LIBRARY. 
100 SECURITIES REGULATION LAW JOURNAL [VOL 5 : 99 
mists' analyses of antitrust opinions. Admittedly, the models 
we construct may not be very successful in explaining what 
happens to concepts such as market power in any given opin-
ion. Still, if the general issue is that of statutory interpretation, 
I fail to see why our analyses of the Sherman and Clayton Acts 
are not fully as useful as anything you can construct to explain 
why the Court regarded the tender offers regulated by Section 
14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as somehow 
fundamentally different from the proxy solicitations regulated 
by Section 14(a) of that same statute. 
A: I agree that the parallel you suggest exists, but I think the 
nuance that separates the majority and dissent in Bangor Punta 
is also what accounts for your difficulty in analyzing decisions 
interpreting the Sherman and Clayton Acts. One way of at-
tempting to define that nuance is to distinguish between market 
concentration, which I would call an economic concept, and 
market power, which I would designate as political. In this 
sense, I think that your difficulty with antitrust decisions is 
that they interpret the Sherman and Clayton Acts in terms of 
the dangers of market power, rather than concentration. 
Q: If you mean simply that economics prefers to deal with con-
cepts defined in mathematical terms, I understand your distinc-
tion between economics and politics; otherwise, I fear you are 
defining a nuance that eludes me. 
A: Since we are dealing with the question of ascertaining the mean-
ing of the rules mandated by the legislature, perhaps it will help 
to point out that what I am calling economics focuses on the 
creation of general rules. Economic analysis postulates identi-
cal individuals and attempts to ascertain the most likely result 
of their interaction. Politics, on the other hand, because it 
focuses on the application of rules, rather than on their creation, 
postulates that a basis for interaction exists and analyzes the 
ways in which interactions that can be characterized as similar 
nevertheless impact differently on different individuals. 
Politics, in this sense, postulates community and investigates 
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either make or are conditioned to accept, whereas economics 
postulates individuals and investigates the nature of the com-
munity produced by their interactions. What I think you find 
confusing in antitrust decisions is that their rationale is based 
not on the concentration demonstrated by the evidence, but on 
the likely effect of that degree of economic concentration in 
the particular factual setting presented. Thus, the significance 
of a given share is obviously crucially affected by the market 
shares held by present competitors, and the likelihood of the 
appearance of more competitors in the future. 
Q: I think I understand your analysis but fear I find it rhetorical, 
rather than analytic. We are indeed dealing with a legal ques-
tion, but I feel my agreement with the dissent's reading of 
Section 14 is based on legal, rather than what you designate 
economic, analysis . In particular, I think that what the dissent 
demonstrates is that Cort v. Ash, 2 in fact, supports its position. 
What I cannot accept is what I assume your politics/ economics 
distinction forces you to argue; that the precedential significance 
of Cort v. Ash is vitiated by the fact that the Court, in that 
case, explicitly noted that "our conclusion ... preterrnits any 
occasion for addressing the question of respondent's standing 
as a citizen and voter to maintain this action for respondent 
seeks damages only derivatively as stockholder." 3 
A : No, I do not think that that statement vitiates the relevance 
of Cort; it's simply that I read precedent less rigidly than you. 
As a result, it seems to me important that Cort is not the only 
precedent about whose meaning the majority and dissent dis-
agree. But I think the more fundamental divergence between 
legal and economic analysis is that I refuse to assume that the 
precedent contained in a judicial opinion necessarily has the 
same significance when applied to a different factual context. 
For me, in short, law is continually defining its categories by 
ascertaining whether or not given factual si tuations fit within 
them, rather than continually mapping the boundaries of the 
2 422 u.s. 66, 77 (1975). 
3[d. 
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categories in terms of which the factual situations being treated 
are defined. 
Q': Even if I accepted the latter procedure as characteristic of 
economic analysis, I don't understand how what you designate 
as legal analysis would help us understand the divergent ap-
proaches of the majority and dissent to the factual situation 
adjudicated in the Bangor Punta opinion. 
A: What I would focus on is note 21 in the majority opinion: 
"The dissent emphasizes that Borak involved a derivative 
suit brought on behalf of the corporation, in addition to the 
shareholder's direct cause of action. Since corporations were 
not the primary beneficiaries of § 14 (a) -the proxy provi-
sion involved in Borak- the dissent concludes that Borak 
itself fails to meet the 'especial class' requirement articulated 
by our subsequent decision in Cart v. Ash . ... But this is a 
misreading of Borak; there, the Court observed that decep-
tive proxy solicitations violative of § 14 (a) injure the cor-
poration in the following sense: 
" 'The damage suffered results not from the deceit practiced 
on [the individual shareholder) alone but rather from the 
deceit practiced on the stockholders as a group.' 377 U.S., 
at 432. 
"The Borak Court was thus focusing on all stockholders-
the owners of the corporation-as the beneficiaries of § 14(a). 
Stockholders as a class therefore plainly constituted the 
'especial class' for which the proxy provisions were en-
acted. This reading of Borak comports with the statement 
of the question presented in that case: 
" 'We consider only the question of whether §27 of the Act 
authorizes a federal cause of action for rescission or damages 
to a corporate stockholder with respect to a consummated 
merger . .. .' Id., at 428. (Emphasis supplied.)" 
Q: I don't understand the distinction between stockholders "as a 
class" and stockholders individually, in the context of the in-
terpretation of Section 14. 
1977] COMPETITION AND CORPORATE LAW 103 
A: Perhaps the best way to put it is that the majority views Section 
14(a) as protecting shareholders "as a class" in the sense that 
the concern about misinformation is injury to the corporation. 
Since the corporation cannot itself be injured, however, what 
is being protected is the process in terms of which corporate 
decisions are made, and the individual shareholder recovers 
damages, not because he is injured in the amount of the dam-
ages, but because he participates in the process. 
As the majority views 14(e), however, the shareholder is 
not a participant in a process,4 but an individual decision-
maker benefiting from competition, who is assisted by the 
provisions of Section 14 (e) in the sense that they ensure that 
he has access to all relevant information. 
Q: If what 14(e) relies on to benefit the shareholder is competi-
tion, how do you answer the dissent's argument that "once one 
recognizes that Congress intended to rely heavily on private 
litigation as a method of implementing the statute, it seems 
equally clear that Congress would not exclude the persons most 
interested in effective enforcement from the class authorized to 
enforce the new law. . . . It is fundamental in our adversary 
system that the selfish interest of the litigant provides the best 
guarantee that a claim will be effectively asserted." 5 
A: The general answer is that the competition I was referring to 
is political, rather than economic, and that the postulation of 
community in this case entaHs the assumption that the tender 
offerors would not both continue to solicit tenders unless the 
terms of their competition were defined by mutually acceptable 
rules. The more precise response is that the majority found it 
"likely . . . that shareholders may be prejudiced because some 
tender offers may never be made if there is a possibility of 
massive damage claims for what courts subsequently hold to 
be an actionable violation of § 14 (e) . " 6 
4 See note 1 supra, at 926 at 942: " 'We are concerned with the investor 
who today is just a pawn in a form of industrial warfare.' " 
5 Note 1 supra, at 926 at 959, 960 (footnote omitted). 
6 I d. at 948 (footnote omitted). 
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Q: Insofar as I understand your definition of political competition, 
it seems to me that you are once again substituting rhetoric for 
analysis, since so far as I can tell, you are defining a situation 
in which the nature of the governing rules simply could not be 
ascertained except by the participants. Are you arguing that 
that is the nature of political competition sanctioned by corpo-
rate law? 
A: If you accept the proposition that Rosenfeld v. Fairchild En-
gine and Airplane Corp.7 was a conscious attempt to delineate 
the common law of corporate political competition, I would 
argue that, in the absence of legislation, the nature of the rules 
governing that competition is precisely what the competitors 
find mutually agreeable. Thus, while the dissent in that case 
effectively demonstrates the impossibility-in practical terms-
of a distinction between "personal power" and "policy" con-
tests, 8 it fails effectively to respond to incumbent management's 
claim on corporate resources at least for the purpose of making 
the contest an equal one in financial terms. 9 As a result, the 
decision in that case appears to be restricted to a ruling on 
the technical question of allocating burden of proof in con-
nection with corporate campaign expenditures, 10 although the 
final comment in the concurring opinion leaves open the pos-
sibility that there may indeed exist situations in which cam-
paign expenditures would be found to be "intrinsically un-
lawful." 11 
Q: I have two difficulties with the claim that the Rosenfeld case 
is relevant to the situation we are considering. First, what we 
are concerned about is precisely the fact that the legislature 
has acted. As a result, I think that any precedent that is rel-
evant to the question of ascertaining legislative intent cannot 
be read to stand for a proposition as narrow as one involving 
a failure to meet a burden of proof. 
7 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955). 
8/d. at 291, 295, 299. 
9/d. at 291, 293. 
10 /d. at 291, 293, 294. 
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A : I agree with your argument in the sense that I find the concur-
rence in Bangor Punta12 unsatisfactory on precisely that basis. 
But I fail to see how your argument is persuasive that the 
dissent's view of legislative intent is to be preferred to the 
majority's. 
Q: I think once again that the answer\fo your question is that my 
view of precedent is wholly consistent with legal analysis, and 
that what separates us is purely a matter of rhetoric. Thus, the 
precedent I would focus on is 1.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 13 and 
note that, like the dissent, "I do not understand, even under 
the Court's interpretation of Borak as protecting all sharehold-
ers ... [the] holding that only some Piper shareholders are 
protected-i.e., 'ordinary' shareholders as opposed to holders of 
large blocks." 14 
A: The distinction you are failing to recognize is, I submit, pre-
cisely the one with which our conversation began, the nuance 
that is the difference between a focus on concentration per se 
and a focus on the power that may result from such concen-
tration. I note, moreover, that the majority is perfectly aware 
that, in another situation, the fact of shareholding per se might 
well be sufficient to confer standing. Thus, it even explicitly 
raised the possibility15 that shareholders suing under Section 
14 (e) might not be subject to the purchaser-seller requirement 
enunciated in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores. 16 
Q: You mean that the dissent's analysis may govern the next case 
involving Section 14 (e)? 
A: Yes. Perhaps, after all, the nub of our disagreement is whether 
precedent is more clearly understood as a political or economic 
model, if we define model as a representation of reality, eco-
nomic models as things defined in terms that purport to explain 
12 Note 1 supra, at 926 at 953. 
13 377 u.s. 426 (1964). 
14 Note 1 supra, at 926 at 962 n.18. 
15Jd . at 948 n.25. 
16 421 u.s. 723 ( 1975). 
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present facts, and political models as descriptions of reality 
that leave to the future the determination of what it is that the 
terms used have, in fact, represented. 
The Santa Fe Opinion: Concerning the 
Cost of Corporate Law 
Q: If precedent is the basis for law, I do not understand how the 
Santa Fe opinion17 makes any contribution. The penultimate 
footnote makes clear that the decision contemplates the pos-
sibility that divergent results will be reached depending on 
which state's law is found to be applicable. 18 Yet worse, how-
ever, the last citation in the last footnote 19 is to a law-review 
piece20 cited for the proposition that "traditional doctrines of 
substantive corporate law [can be applied to] 'going private' 
transactions .... " 21 What the opinion fails to note is that that 
piece offered a solution in that it specifically noted that "the 
misappropriation of the ability to go public again can be easily 
removed from going private transactions, through the jssuance 
of warrant. ... " 22 
A: I admit that the possibility of divergent results is a price we 
pay for living in a federal society. The question, of course, is 
whether it is a necessary one in corporate law. I would note 
only that the very law-review piece you cite was careful to 
point out that the solution it was offering was to a specific 
problem [the misappropriation of the ability to go public again] 
and that it was also careful to "contrast [that problem] to [the] 
fiduciary issues" 23 dealt with in the cases surveyed in the Santa 
Fe opinion. 
Q: If your point is that any particular solution to a problem does 
17 Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 97 S. Ct. 1292 ( 1977). 
18 /d. at 1303-1 304 n.16. 
19/d. at 1304 n.17. 
20 Note, "Going Private," 84 Yale L.J. 903 (1974). 
21 Note 17 supra, at 1304 n.17. 
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not necessarily cover all the ways in which that problem may 
be manifested in the fu ture, I, of course, agree with you. In 
terms of our argument about law, however, I fail to see what 
effect this agreement has on the issue of the choice between the 
economic and political models of precedent. Naturally, I agree 
that a statute enacting such a solution would not eliminate the 
need for litigation but want to point out that the same footnote 
citing the law-review piece we have been discussing also cites 
an article by William Cary24 that explicitly argues that the 
inadequacies of the Delaware statute are not compensated for 
by the "relative ease of entry into Delaware courts for suits 
against corporate directors." 25 
A : As usual, our disagreement seems to me more fundamental 
than the one to which you are responding. Thus, the question 
that separates us is not, I think, the difference between rules 
contained in statutes or enunciated by courts, but rather the 
extent to which the articulation of any solution to a given 
problem can serve as a precedent for future situations. Specif-
ically in terms of federalism and corporate law, it seems to me 
significant that in Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 26 where the 
issue is precisely the percentage of stock ownership necessary 
to bring into play the fiduciary standards delineated in Perlman 
v. Feldmann, 27 Judge Friendly, after noting that "there is hardly 
enough New York authority for a really informed prediction 
what the New York Court of Appeals would decide on the 
facts here presented .. . yet too much for us to have the freedom 
used to good effect in Perlman v. Feldmann," 28 concludes that 
"the development of doctrine" 29 concerning "a question of 
New York law, of enormous importance to all New York cor-
porations and their stockholders," 30 should be "[left] .. . to the 
24 Cary, "Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware," 
83 Yale L.J. 663 (1974). 
25/d. at 686. 
26 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962) . 
27 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955). 
28305 F.2d 572,580 (2dCir. 1962). 
29 /d. a t 582. 
Jo /d. at 580. 
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State, which has primary concern for it." 31 Strikingly, more-
over, even where a state does develop doctrine in connection 
with fid uciary standards as in Diamond v. Oreamuno,32 it is by 
no means certain that a federal court attempting to apply that 
doctrine may not itself underestimate the li kelihood of a diver-
gent result being reached in another jurisdiction. 33 
Q: Accepting what you have described as a price necessarily ex-
acted by the diversity made possible by a federal system, I fail 
to see why that argues aga inst the possibili ty of solving a cor-
porate law problem by means of promulgation of a rule whose 
initial formulation is both detailed and comprehensive and that 
also contains the procedures necessary to keep it up to date. 
A: Even assuming, though I think it is an assumption contrary to 
fact, that our society would be willing to bear the costs required 
by such a rule, I think it impossible to draft the type of rule 
you describe when the subject to which it applies is Uqited 
States corporations. 
Q: I, of course, agree with you that no such rule could be drafted 
if it were applicable to the corner grocery store, as well as to 
General Motors, but assuming it were restricted to that relatively 
small group of corporations whose power is causing a good 
deal of public concern, what are the costs whose burden you 
believe society would be unwilling to shoulder? 
A: In the absence of an adversary system of litigation, the bureau-
cratic costs of keeping a complex and detailed set of rules up 
to date, and I cite the Internal Revenue Code as an example 
of the phenomenon I am attempting to avoid. If we assume 
litigation, the cost, of course, would be borne primarily by the 
corporations to which the rule was applied, but I think our 
experience under the Public Utili ty Holding Company Act is 
persuasive that any such process would be both expensive and 
time-consuming. 
3 1 /d. at 582. 
32 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910 (1969) . 
33 See Schein v. Chasen, 519 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1975). 
J 
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Q: Granted that the process would not be cheap, if you grant only 
that the problem is regarded as sufficiently serious, and that 
the costs involved in the initial formulation of the rule are ones 
that the society is willing to bear, what are your objections to 
imposing even substantial additional costs on a small group of 
United States corporations? 
A: I think the easiest way to answer that question is to indicate 
that there is a good deal about the operation of the Federal 
Elections Commission and the statute under wh ich it operates 
that I find disturbing, and it is precisely those phenomena that 
make me prefer that we attempt to continue to regulate conduct 
by following a political, rather than economic, model, and 
bear the costs entailed in living with the uncertainty resulting 
from accepting as law the rule embodied in Rosenfeld v. Fair-
child Engine and Airplane Corp. 34 
34 Note 7 supra. 
DOING IT THE FRENCH WAY 
Reporting on tax evasion in France, the New York Times revealed a 
tantalizing technique. An owner of a relatively small business bought a 
chateau, listing it as a rest home for retired employees, and installed two 
of his former employee-mistresses in it. 
That's real estate tax planning! 
